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PRIVATE USE OF PUBLIC FACILITIES: A
COMMENT ON GILMORE V. CITY OF
MONTGOMERY
Larry W. Yackle*
Perhaps the principal shortcoming of constitutional adjudication in the Supreme Court of the United States is the Court's recurrent failure to set forth principles of decision that rise above the
result reached in any particular case.' The other branches of the
national government, the states, the bar, and ultimately the public
at large require guidance concerning the pressing constitutional issues of the day. That guidance can come only from the Supreme
Court, for, to be sure, "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is." 2 To the extent
the Court shrinks from its duty, declining to decide cases or leaving
the doctrine underlying its decisions unclear or unstated, the nation
is left adrift, without the fundamental understanding upon which
the rule of law depends.
A number of reasons may be given for the Court's failure to
provide more guidance. First among them is the basic paradox of
the modem Court's docket. The Court's role is to decide cases involving questions that transcend the immediate interests of the litigants. Yet, under Article III of the Constitution, the Court has jurisdiction to decide only actual cases or controversies between adversaries with a substantial stake in the outcome.3 Thus any particular
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. A.B., J.D. Kansas;
LL.M. Harvard.

1. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1
(1959); Hart, Foreword. The Time Chart of the Justices, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73
HARv. L. REv. 84 (1959); see Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the
Supreme Court, 84 HAv. L. REV. 769 (1971).
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
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opinion cannot range beyond the needs of the case at bar, even if a
more precise statement of lasting standards would seem to demand
it.' A second reason for the Court's failure to set forth clear principles of decision may be found in the judicial temperament. Even in
those cases in which the Court has power to act, there is a certain
resistance to activism. Accordingly, the Court may couch its opinions in careful language, groomed to the peculiar facts of the case
at hand, or resort to evasive procedural devices in order to avoid
premature or particularly far-reaching decisions.5 There is a third
reason for uninstructive opinions. The Supreme Court's failure to
set forth lasting principles for the solution of problems in the future
may be traced to the Court's result-oriented approach to constitutional adjudication. While the issue is not free from doubt, 7 respected opinion holds that the Court's practice of coming to a
constitutional decision after weighing and balancing the interests
and factors involved is at odds with the concept of a written Constitution.' The approach borrows the case-by-case method of the common law, resolving cases on the basis of judgment on the relative
weight to be given conflicting policies and values. Interpretation of
the Constitution, it can be argued, requires more rigorous fidelity
to a definite benchmark, the written Constitution. Constitutional
adjudication is not properly the adjustment process of a continuously developing common law, but rather a consistent adherence to
established principles arising from specific provisions of the basic
document.' Finally, it has been suggested that the Supreme Court's
docket is so crowded with cases, each requiring the Justices' undivided attention, that there is simply insufficient time devoted to
any one case to permit the careful scrutiny which reasoned judg-

4.

P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrTED STATES 16 (1961).

5.

See Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, The Supreme Court,1960 Term, 75 HAv.

L. REv. 40 (1961); cf. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 321 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). One common example of this technique is the practice of remanding a case to a lower
court for development of the record. Of this Mr. Justice Brandeis was the master. P. FREUND,
supra note 4, at 120-21.
6. See Wechsler, supra note 1; Pollak, Racial Discriminationand JudicialIntegrity: A
Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959); Black, Foreword: "State Action,"
Equal Protection,and California'sProposition14, 81 HIv. L. REv. 69 (1967); see also Frantz,
The FirstAmendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
7. See Kadish, Methodology and Criteriain Due ProcessAdjudication: A Survey and
Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957).
8. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rsv. 865 (1960).
9. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution,76 HsAv. L. REv. 673, 736-44
(1963).
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ment demands."0 In recent years, notwithstanding the Judiciary Act
of 1925," the Court's docket has expanded enormously, and the
of the quality of
consequence may well be the steady deterioration
2
opinion-writing.'
as
well
as
decision-making
To varying extents, the Supreme Court's recent opinion in
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery'3 is illustrative of the operation of
each of these factors. The result is a thoroughly unsatisfactory constitutional decision, which fails to establish principles against which
the future conduct of the parties or others can be judged. Although
10. Hart, supra note 1.
11. The Act of 1925 established the principle that the Supreme Court should decide
only cases of general importance to the nation. Specifically, the Act enlarged the Court's
certiorarijurisdiction and reserved appellate review for a narrow category of cases. This left
the Court with substantial discretionary control of its own docket. See P. FREUND, supra note
4, at 12-13.
12. Years ago, Professor Hart warned the Court of the result suggested in the text. After
an extensive examination of the Court's 1958 term, he determined that opinions, on an
average, must have been prepared in twenty-four working hours. The conclusion he drew was
sobering.
If what has just been said is accepted, the conclusion emerges inexorably that
the number of cases which the Supreme Court tries to decide by full opinion, far from
being increased, ought to be materially decreased. An average of twenty-four hours
may be enough time, or more than enough, in which to prepare a superficially plausible rationalization of what is in substance an ipse dixit. It may even be enough time
in which to prepare a genuinely workmanlike opinion which accurately reports the
facts of record and the issues arising out of them and deals systematically and
conscientiously with all the contentions of counsel and the relevant precedents which
counsel cite. But opinions which bring to problems the fresh illumination of personal
research and of hard, independent thought cannot be written that fast. Anyone who
has spent his life in working with ideas can speak with assurance about this. Ideas
which will stand the test of time as instruments for the solution of hard problems do
not come even to the most gifted of lawyers in twenty-four hours. Indeed, they do
not come with dependability to any single individual even in much longer periods of
study and reflection. Such ideas have ordinarily to be hammered out by a process of
collective deliberation of individuals, gifted or otherwise, who recognize that the
wisdom of all, if it is successfully pooled, will usually transcend the wisdom of any.
This, of course, is the theory and the justification in principle of all collegial tribunals, and especially of tribunals of last resort ...
The opinions of the Justices, if one turns to them, confirm the conclusion that
the Court is trying to decide more cases than it can decide well. Regretfully and with
deference, it has to be said that too many of the Court's opinions are about what one
would expect could be written in twenty-four hours.
Hart, supra note 1, at 99-100. For a more recent analysis of the Supreme Court's caseload,
see FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT O THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME
COURT (1972); see also REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL BRANCH, Remarks of the Honorable
Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States, delivered before the American Bar
Association, Washington, D.C. August 6, 1973; but see Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States,
409 U.S. 151, 174 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Court is not overworked
with respect to cases that are set down for argument and full opinion).
13. 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
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the case presented an excellent opportunity for analyzing the constitutional limitations on private use of public recreational facilities,
the Court's treatment of the problem is sadly lacking. This article
will examine the opinion in Gilmore in some depth, in an effort to
identify and analyze the Court's reasons for failing to develop principles for dealing with analogous cases in the future. The intent is
to demonstrate that standards can be found, if the tools of analysis
are employed; and that useful standards, however flawed, are far
superior to none at all. In short, we are entitled to demand more
from the Supreme Court. To paraphrase Professor Freund, albeit in
another context, the question is not whether the Court can do everything but whether it can do something.'4
On first blush, the facts of Gilmore were not overly complex.
Indeed, the lower courts had strived to clarify the issues for decision.
The petitioners in the class action suit were black residents of Montgomery, Alabama. As a part of long-standing litigation designed to
desegregate Montgomery's public recreational facilities, the petitioners asked the federal district court for an order banning the use
of public facilities by segregated school and non-school private
groups. Their contention was that the city's authorization of such
use constituted state action in violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment and the city's affirmative duty
to disestablish the dual school system in Montgomery. The district
court, in a four-part order, enjoined the city authorities from permitting the use of public recreational facilities by any private segregated school group or any non-school group which had a racially
discriminatory admissions policy. 5 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit

14. P. FREUND, supra note 4, at 89.
15. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 337 F. Supp. 22 (M.D. Ala. 1972). Specifically, the
district court's order provided:
1. That the City of Montgomery, Alabama's policy and practice of permitting
the use of city owned or operated recreational facilities by any private school, or
private school affiliated group, which school or group is racially segregated or which
has a racially discriminatory admissions policy be and the same is hereby declared
unconstitutional.
2. That said City of Montgomery, Alabama, its officers, agents, servants, employees, and those acting in concert with it, be and each is hereby enjoined from
permitting or in any way sanctioning the use of city owned or operated recreational
facilities by any private school, or private school affiliated group, if such school or
group is racially segregated or if it has a racially discriminatory admissions policy.
3. That said City of Montgomery, Alabama's policy and practice of permitting
the use of city owned or operated recreational facilities by any private group, club or
organization which has a racially discriminatory admissions policy be and the same
is hereby declared unconstitutional.
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Court of Appeals reversed in part and remanded the case with directions. The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's order insofar as
it enjoined what the circuit called "exclusive" use of public facilities
by private segregated school groups. But the circuit court invalidated that part of the order which enjoined non-exclusive use of facilities by private school children. Additionally, the circuit court held
that the district court's injunction against the use of facilities by
non-school groups was not founded upon a sufficient showing of
state action."
Thus the case in the Supreme Court was focused along rather
clearly defined lines. The district court's order, as it had been circumscribed by the circuit court's opinion, posed the problem of
private use of public facilities in three situations: (1) The exclusive
use of facilities by private segregated school groups; (2) The nonexclusive use of facilities by private segregated school groups; and
(3) The use of facilities by private non-school groups with racially
discriminatory admissions policies. The parties hoped for but did
not receive clear statements of principle on any of the three. Generally, adjudication of the case in the Supreme Court accomplished
very little. The Court emphasized "[t]he usual prudential tenets
limiting the exercise of judicial power" 7 and declined to deal with
issues that the parties might not have standing to raise. In addition,
the holding on the issue it did decide was tied so closely to the
particular facts of the case at bar that it is questionable whether
future litigants may reasonably and safely rely upon it. The brunt
of the case was remanded to the trial court for development of the
record, and the fluid test for determining state action was left intact, with no principled elaboration to guide the lower courts. Perhaps the case, coming as it did in the rush to summer recess, presented too many complex problems for the Court to treat in the time
allotted. In any event, the law on private use of public recreational
facilities was left in obscurity. The question which must be asked
is whether the reasons the Gilmore Court offered for failing to give
more guidance for the future were sufficient.

4. That said City of Montgomery, Alabama, its officers, agents, servants, employees and those acting in concert with it, be and each is hereby enjoined from
permitting or in any way sanctioning the use of city owned or operated recreational
facilities by any private group, club or organization which is not affiliated with a
private school and which has a racially discriminatory admissions policy.
Id. at 26.
16. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 473 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1973).
17. 417 U.S. at 571 n.1O.
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EXCLUSIVE USE OF PUBLIC FACILITIES BY PRIVATE SEGREGATED
SCHOOLS

The majority opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice Blackmun,
began with an extensive review of the litigation. The petitioners had
originally initiated the action in 1958, in an attempt to desegregate
the public parks in Montgomery. In its first order in the case, the
district court held a city ordinance mandating segregation unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement.'8 However, even before the
district court's order was rendered, the city closed all its recreational
parks, athletic fields, swimming pools, and playgrounds. These were
not reopened until 1965.'1 The case lay dormant until 1970 when the
petitioners asked that the city be held in contempt for deliberately
violating the 1959 parks desegregation order. In separate litigation,
it had been established that the city had conspired with the local
YMCA to operate a segregated recreational program in
Montgomery, using public facilities. 0 The 1970 claims were settled
by agreement early in 1971, but later in that same year the petitioners returned to the district court with a motion for supplemental
relief. That motion raised for the first time the allegation that the
city was violating the equal protection clause by permitting segregated private groups to use public recreational facilities. This motion became the basis for the Supreme Court's opinion.
The Court turned first to the "exclusive use" test adopted by
the circuit court. While the district court had enjoined any use of
public facilities by private segregated school groups, the circuit
court upheld the order only insofar as it reached the "exclusive
possession of public recreational facilities such as football stadiums,
baseball diamonds, basketball courts, and tennis courts for official
athletic contests and similar functions sponsored by racially segregated private schools."'" Understandably, the Supreme Court had
difficulty. Justice Blackmun found the concept of exclusive use
helpful "not so much as a controlling legal principle but as a description of a type of use and, in the context of this case, suggestive
of a means of allocating public recreational facilities."22 The Su18. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 176 F. Supp. 776 (M.D. Ala. 1959). On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the order and further instructed the district court to retain jurisdiction,
in order to assure compliance. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 277 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1960).
19. 417 U.S. at 559 n.1.
20. Smith v. YMCA, 316 F. Supp. 899 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd as modified, 462 F.2d
634 (5th Cir. 1972).
21. 473 F.2d at 836-37 (emphasis supplied).
22. 417 U.S. at 566.
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preme Court read "exclusive use" to mean, at least implicitly, that
a public facility is in the complete and exclusive possession of a
private group and the city has consciously allocated the use of the
facility to that group rather than some other private or public organization.?3
Next, Justice Blackmun took up the question of the 1959 parks
desegregation order. Apparently analogizing from the school desegregation cases, 24 he reasoned that after the 1959 order the city was
under an affirmative constitutional duty to eliminate any practice
in the city parks which reflected the discredited "separate but
equal" doctrine.25 However, rather than complying promptly with
the desegregation order, the city orchestrated an elaborate scheme
for evading the plain meaning of the order. Here Justice Blackmun
drew upon the facts established in the YMCA case and made a part
of the record in Gilmore.21 He said that "[iln light of these facts
• . . it was entirely appropriate for the District Court carefully to
scrutinize any practice or policy that would tend to abandon to
segregated private groups facilities normally open to members of all
races on an equal basis." 27
Finally, the Court turned to the "[p]articularly important"
point "that the city's policies operated directly to contravene an

23. On this second point, Justice Blackmun was ambiguous. His precise words were:
"It [exclusive use] also implies, without mandating, a decision-making role for the city in
allocating such facilities among private and, for that matter, public groups." 417 U.S. at 566
(emphasis supplied). Apparently, Justice Blackmun understood the circuit court as referring
only to organized functions, implying planning and scheduling on the part of city authorities.
The city was necessarily in the position of allocating scarce resources. Since only one group
at a time can hold complete possession of a facility, the circuit court's concept of exclusive
use must have included decision-making by the City of Montgomery. On the other hand,
nothing in the circuit court's opinion said precisely that. Hence, Justice Blackmun's careful
language.
24. E.g., Green v. County Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
25. The Court cited Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963). Watson held only that
the City of Memphis must desegregate its public parks immediately. Although the Court
had indicated in Dawson v. Mayor, 220 F.2d 386, aff'd, 350 U.S. 877 (1954), that parks would
be controlled by the principles established in Brown, neither Dawson nor Watson established any affirmative duty to eliminate "root and branch every vestige of the separate but equal
doctrine" in public parks. It is noteworthy that the Court did not use that language in a school
case until Green v. County Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968), decided five years after Watson.
Prior to Green, many courts assumed that the law, even in school cases, was summed up in
the famous dictum from Fourth Circuit Judge John Parker: "The Constitution. . . does not
require integration. It merely forbids discrimination." Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777
(E.D.S.C. 1955). Accordingly, Justice Blackmun's opinion in Gilmore seems to have broken
new ground, extending the affirmative duty established in the school cases to public parks.
26. See Smith v. YMCA, 316 F. Supp. 899 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd as modified, 462 F.2d
634 (5th Cir. 1972).
27. 417 U.S. at 567.
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outstanding school desegregation order." 8 The district court had, as
early as 1964, declared the Montgomery school system to be segregated and ordered appropriate relief. 29 Here again, the city had an

affirmative duty to disestablish segregation: the dual school system.
Justice Blackmun used strong language in condemning any arrangement which significantly tends to perpetuate segregated public
schools. He agreed with both lower courts that the use of public
facilities for organized recreational and athletic events by private
segregated schools constitutes significant aid to the schools and thus
may be enjoined. The Supreme Court, again following the lower
courts, listed three ways in which private schools are aided. First,
private schools' use of public facilities permits them to provide complete athletic programs that enhance their attractiveness to white
students. Second, use of public facilities for recreational events results in a capital savings for private schools. Consequently, they are
able to divert funds that might pay for recreational facilities to other
programs. Third, private schools are able to generate revenue by
operating concessions during events held on public property.
In light of the foregoing, the Supreme Court upheld that part
of the circuit court's order which affirmed the district court's ban
on the exclusive use of public facilities by private segregated school
groups. Perhaps the most striking aspect of the holding was its
extremely narrow character. First, the Court dwelled at length upon
the history of the litigation and the city's long-standing recalcitrance in civil rights matters. Then, adopting a restricted understanding of "exclusive use," the Court emphasized the two outstanding orders requiring the desegregation of public schools and
28. Id. The Court quoted from the landmark opinion in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958):
[The constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated against. . . can
neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state executive or
judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted "ingeniously or ingenuously."
Id, at 17. The Gilmore Court also relied upon Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), the
recent case which struck down the Mississippi program of supplying textbooks to all children-including those attending private segregated schools. Norwood held that any state
assistance to private segregated schools is prohibited if it has "a significant tendency to
facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination." Id. at 466. For an examination of
the effect of "white-flight" academies on public education, see Note, SegregationAcademies
and State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436 (1973).
29. Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 232 F. Supp. 705 (M.D. Ala. 1964), 253
F. Supp. 306 (M.D. Ala. 1966), 289 F. Supp. 647 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd as modified, 400 F.2d 1,
402 F.2d 782 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd and remanded sub nom., United States v. Montgomery
County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969) (instructing the circuit court to affirm the district

court's order).
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parks in Montgomery and the city's affirmative duty to desegregate
both the schools and parks. Only then was the Court prepared to
affirm the lower courts on the only issue upon which they had
agreed. In consequence, the Gilmore holding on the exclusive use of
public recreational facilities by private segregated schools is of questionable value as precedent. It is unlikely that many cases will arise
with the same wealth of factual support for injunctive relief. Of
course, constitutional doctrine characteristically assumes a life of
its own and often controls subsequent cases even when factual distinctions are apparent.3 0 Whether the Gilmore holding will reach
beyond the peculiar facts which gave rise to it thus remains to be
seen.
II.

NON-EXCLUSIVE USE OF PUBLIC FACILITIES BY PRIVATE SEGREGATED SCHOOLS

If those who seek principles of decision from Supreme Court
opinions were disappointed at the Court's handling of the first issue
in Gilmore, they found even less of precedential value in the remainder of the opinion. The Court turned next to an issue that had
divided the lower courts-non-exclusive use of public facilities by
school groups. The Court said simply that, "[u]pon this record,"
it was unable to draw conclusions.' Essentially, the Court gave two
reasons for failing to deal thoroughly with the question presented.
First, the Court expressed doubt as to the petitioners' standing.
Second, the Court complained that the factual record was inadequate for a solid constitutional judgment on the merits. These must
be taken in turn.
A. Standing
While the Court was persuaded that the exclusive use of facilities injured the petitioners, it was not sure that non-exclusive use
would, in every case, result in cognizable harm to them. The Court
noted that the petitioners were parties in the parks desegregation
case, but, to the extent the resolution of the question might rest on
the city's lack of compliance with the school desegregation order, it
was questionable whether these petitioners were the proper parties
to complain.3 2 On the surface, the reasoning seems plausible. Certainly, if a litigant can claim no injury in fact, he has no stake in
30. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-44 (1974).
31. 417 U.S. at 570.
32. Id. n.10.
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the outcome and the jurisdictional requirement of a case or controversy is absent. 3 And, if the Gilmore petitioners were not parties to
the school desegregation suit, the Court might reasonably hold that
they must make a showing of injury before being entitled to relief
based on a violation of the order in that case. However, three points
come immediately to mind.
First, the Court in Gilmore affirmed the lower courts' decision
to grant relief to the petitioners on their claim concerning exclusive
use of public facilities by school groups. Since that holding was
based, at least in part, on a finding that the city had violated the
school desegregation order, it is clear that the Court found no difficulty in the petitioners' reliance upon the city's duties arising from
the school desegregation order-so long as the petitioners could
show injury in fact. Apparently, the Court was prepared to say that
exclusive use of facilities injured these petitioners, but it was unwilling to concede that non-exclusive use would necessarily do the
same. The mind's eye sees black children barred at the gate when
segregated academy teams have exclusive possession of a playing
field, but allowed to enter when segregated teams occupy only a
portion of the field. Second, the Gilmore petitioners were clearly
able to demonstrate just the injury in fact the Court demanded.
Indeed, their case was built on the proposition that they were denied an equal opportunity to use public facilities as a consequence
of the city's policy. Whether black people were denied access to an
entire facility or only some part of it, the result was the samediscrimination on the basis of race. Moreover, the Gilmore petitioners suffered psychological injury whether they rested their
claim on alleged violation of outstanding orders or some other unlawful conduct on the part of city authorities. 4 Third, even a cur33. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); cf. National Lawyer's Guild v. Board of
Regents, 490 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1973) (dismissing as moot a petition seeking an order requiring
a college to make facilities available for a meeting to be conducted by a private group).
34. Specifically, the petitioners argued as follows:
The petitioners of course complain that they have lost the full or partial use of
specific recreational facilities during the time they are used by an all-white school
group, but more importantly they emphasize that the more substantial burden stems
from the fact that the city has become associated with and has lent its prestige to
the private racial discrimination. . . . Petitioners in the case sub judice are made
to suffer the "Constitutional odium of official approval" of racial segregation whenever the city permits the use of its recreational facilities by private segregated
schools.
Brief for Petitioners at 30 (citations omitted). Thus the real issue for the petitioners was the
"psychological burden" involved in the city's policy. Id. at 41; see Wright v. City of Brighton,
441 F.2d 447 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 915 (1971). For a general argument that the
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sory examination of the papers filed in the school desegregation
suit would have revealed that the definition of the class in that
action-Negro children living and residing in various areas of
Montgomery, Alabama 3 5-overlapped the definition of the class
in Gilmore-Negro citizens of the City of Montgomery." Indeed,
it seems rather clear that the Gilmore petitioners, or persons represented by them, were, in fact, within the class in the school case.
In effect, the same litigants brought both suits, and there was no
basis whatever for denying the petitioners in one the benefits of
the relief granted in the other. The upshot is that the petitioners'
lack of standing was not a real issue in Gilmore. The question was
raised only as a make-weight argument in support of the Court's
more fundamental decision to forego a thorough treatment of the
3
case. 1
B. Adequacy of the Record
The Court also said it would be improper to determine what
relief might be warranted concerning "all the many and varied situations" in which public facilities were used by private groups. The
resolution of the remaining questions was left to the district court
on remand. Justice Blackmun said specifically that the district
court should identify what public facilities were available in Montgomery and to what uses they might be put by private groups. Then,
"under appropriate circumstances," the district court might well
find violations of the two outstanding desegregation orders or state
action involving the city in the discriminatory conduct of private
groups. He gave two examples of situations in which the district
court might find violations of the outstanding desegregation orders.
First, if an all-white private school basketball team were invited to
participate in a tournament held on public property with integrated
teams, Justice Blackmun suggested that the discrimination practiced by the segregated school might have so pervasive an influence
Article IL case or controversy requirement demands no more than injury in fact, see Association of Data Processing Service Organization v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 169 (1970) (opinion of
Justices Brennan and White); Jaffee, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The NonHohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968).
35. Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 232 F. Supp. 705, 706 (M.D. Ala. 1964).
36. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 176 F. Supp. 776, 777 (M.D. Ala. 1959).
37. It is worth noting that, during the last term, the Supreme Court dealt with a
number of standing cases. E.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). Perhaps, then, the reference to standing in Gilmore can
be attributed to a heightened sensitivity to the issue. Unfortunately, the case has created
confusion for lower courts charged with interpreting footnote 10. See Gooden v. Mississippi
State Univ., 499 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1974).
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on the educational system that a violation of the school desegregation order might be found.3 8 The second example involved nonexclusive use of public facilities that might violate the parks desegregation order. Here Justice Blackmun pointed out that
Montgomery provided all-white private and all-black public baseball leagues with playing fields and equipment. He suggested that
the district court might find that such a dual system constitutes 3a9
violation of the outstanding order to desegregate the city parks.
The majority opinion thus focused on the type of use private schools
might give to public facilities, rather than upon the extent to which
any use enhances the programs of private schools and thus constitutes a significant benefit conferred upon them by the City of Montgomery. The opinion also emphasized the complicity of city authorities in scheduling even non-exclusive uses of public facilities by
private school groups. Finally, the majority opinion looked to the
district court for the determination of the merit of the petitioners'
claim about any particular use.
The petitioners' principal objective in taking their case to the
Supreme Court was to free the law from the unworkable "exclusive
use" test adopted by the Fifth Circuit." To be sure, Justice Blackmun rejected the test "as a controlling legal principle,"4 but he
failed to deal thoroughly with the problems raised. What the circuit
court meant by "exclusive use" is anything but clear. The circuit
first stated that the district court had enjoined "exclusive possesfor the purpose of official
sion of public recreational facilities .
school functions . ..
In reality, the district court had not mentioned "exclusive use" but instead had simply enjoined "use. 4 3 In
any event, the circuit went on to say that "to the extent that the
[district] court's order may be read to prohibit the use and enjoyment of public recreational facilities by individual children or
groups of students enrolled at private schools in common with other
members of the public, we find the order to be overbroad."" Thus
the circuit seemed to adopt a facile distinction between exclusive
possession of facilities for official functions on the one hand and
38.
39.
40.
Poverty
41,

417 U.S. at 571.
Id. at 572.
Letter to the writer from Joseph J. Levin, Jr., General Counsel of the Southern
Law Center and Counsel for Petitioners in Gilmore. July 18, 1974.
417 U.S. at 566.

42. 473 F.2d at 837.
43.
44.

See note 15, supra.
473 F.2d at 837.
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individual enjoyment of facilities on the other. A possible example
might be the difference between two private schools assuming exclusive possession of a playing field for an organized baseball game
between school teams and two students enrolled at private schools
stopping by the same field the next morning for a game of catch.
This led Justice Blackmun to adopt his exceedingly narrow "understanding of the term."4 He took "exclusive use" to include only
formal arrangements for the playing of official games by private
schools. The affirmance of the lower courts' action thus reached only
cases in which private schools take over exclusive possession of public facilities, implicitly by prior agreement with city authorities. In
short, the organized ball game may be enjoined but the game of
catch, undertaken without the city's knowledge, is something else
again."
The difficulty with Justice Blackmun's "understanding of the
term" is that it stems from a spot reading of the circuit court's
opinion. After suggesting the simplistic distinction outlined above,
the circuit court went on to discuss the use of facilities by private
school groups in common with other groups and individuals. The
court said that permitting private school groups to visit recreational
facilities, such as zoos, museums, and parks, does not involve the
city in the same degree of state action which condemns the exclusive
use of facilities for school functions.47 The court indicated that permitting this "non-exclusive" use did not violate the Montgomery
school desegregation order, because the schools involved could not
raise revenue from communal use of public facilities. Nor could they
save capital by duplicating public school operations at public expense. Neither public nor private schools attempt to maintain their
48
own zoos and museums.
The circuit's elaboration on the meaning of non-exclusive use
revealed the inadequacy of the exclusive use test itself. For the
circuit, even organized use of public recreational facilities by segregated school groups is permissible, so long as other individuals and
groups may use the same facility at the same time. Perhaps, in the

45. 417 U.S. at 566.
46. There is a temptation to say flatly that this type of unorganized use of public
recreational facilities by individuals cannot be enjoined. Still, nothing in the majority opinion
in Gilmore makes that result clear. It bears repeating that the Supreme Court decided
precious little in Gilmore. And by reversing that part of the circuit court's judgment, which
would have controlled this simple example, the Court hardly clarified the issue.
47. 473 F.2d at 837.
48. Id.
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case of a field trip to the city zoo, the distinction is plausible.4 9 But
there are other, more difficult cases. The petitioners suggested,"
and Justice Blackmun noted,5 ' a good example. If a private school
group occupies two tennis courts in a group of ten, the circuit's
exclusive use test would apparently hold that the use is permissible.
Eight courts remain available for use by others. But certainly, while
the two courts are being used by the school group, black children
are denied use of those courts, not simply because they arrived late,
but because they arrived black.52 Perhaps more importantly, the use
49. The city offered an extreme version of the Gilmore petitioners' case:
The petitioners urge that any assistance whatsoever to private schools, with the
possible exception of basic essentials, would be unconstitutional. It would indeed be
harsh and unconstitutionally unwarranted [sic] to deny individual children and
groups of students who may attend private schools the right to use in common with
other members of the public, a municipal museum or zoo ...
The petitioners would deprive children who may be enrolled in all-white private
schools the opportunity to participate along with other members of the public in all
types of municipally sponsored programs. The argument of the petitioners would
prohibit a group of private school children from being admitted, during school hours,
to the audience of this Court. Would petitioners also restrict a group of students from
an all-white private school from the Smithsonian Institute, the Library of Congress
or from field trips to the Washington Monument or Lincoln Memorial? The "any aid
whatsoever" argument of petitioners would lead to at least these far-reaching and
unwarranted consequences.
Brief for Respondents at 37-38 (footnotes omitted). To this the petitioners replied:
The respondents argue in favor of the Fifth Circuit's position by raising the
spectre of wholesale exclusion of all private school groups from public facilities and
functions throughout the nation. That is quite clearly a bogus issue. The petitioners
and the District Court strictly limit their position to cover only organized school
activities dealing with recreational programs, and the only situation before the Court
is that of recreation. The District Court carefully found that city provision of recreational facilities conferred benefits on the segregationist academies, and recreation is
certainly a normal part of most schools' regular program of learning and instruction
which they may provide on their own grounds. Whether field trips to public monuments or museums involve similar aid to private institutions is problematical, but
in any event such situations must survive or fail on its [sic] own merits if litigated.
Reply Brief for Petitioners at 23-24 (footnotes omitted). Mr. Justice Marshall's separate
opinion in Gilmore took the petitioners' part and accused the majority of rendering an advisory opinion, to the extent matters other than recreation were treated. 417 U.S. at 576
(Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting). In view of the majority's remarkable avoidance of
most issues in the case, Justice Marshall's view lacks persuasiveness. Perhaps he was impatient with the tendency of the respondents, and indeed the courts, to ask what future cases
might be controlled by analogy to a holding on recreational facilities. But that, after all, is
an essential function of the judicial process.
50. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 26.
51. 417 U.S. at 566 n.7.
52. As Justice Blackmun put it:
We understand the term "exclusive use" not to include the situation where only
part of a facility may be allocated to or used by a group, even though that allocation
or use results in the pro tanto exclusion of others. For example, the use of two of a
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of the tennis courts can be translated readily into aid to the private
53
schools concerned.
The petitioners offered an alternative analytical framework for
dealing with particular cases. They would have discarded the exclusive use test and replaced it with a standard focusing on the constitutional prohibition of public aid to segregated private schools.54
Their brief criticized the exclusive use test for permitting Montgomery to provide some aid to private academies in the form of nonexclusive use of public facilities, while forbidding only the substantial aid implicated in exclusive use.5 According to the petitioners,
the key issue was "not the exclusivity of use but whether the city
provision of facilities . . . had 'a significant tendency to facilitate,
reinforce, and support private discrimination.' " The petitioners
then suggested an approach with "res ipsa loquitur overtones." 5
They argued that if a private school desires to use a public facility,
total of 10 tennis courts by a private school group would not constitute an exclusive
use; the use of all 10 would. This is not to say that the use of two by a private school
group would be constitutionally permissible.

Id.
Of course, even if a private school has complete possession of a facility on one date, its
use of the facility is not exclusive in the sense that other dates remain open. The argument
that exclusive use implies a long-term lease was not seriously advanced in Gilmore.This was
probably due to the existence of Fifth Circuit cases holding that a single act on the part of
the state is sufficient to invoke the fourteenth amendment. Thus a school board's sale of a
school building to a private segregated school is invalid even though the board plays no
continuing role in the school's operation. McNeal v. Tate County School Dist., 460 F.2d 568
(5th Cir. 1971); Wright v. City of Brighton, 441 F.2d 447, 450 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
915 (1971).
53. Cf. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973). In fairness, it should be pointed out
that, in a case decided after Gilmore, the Fifth Circuit affirmed its commitment to desegregate public education in ringing terms. In an en banc opinion by Judge Gewin, the court set
aside the lease of a former public school building to a private segregated academy. On the
question of state assistance to segregated schools, the court said:
Our previous pronouncements concerning state involvement with private segregated schools demonstrate that covert efforts by local government officials to circumvent the effectiveness of school desegregation decrees through the leasing or the sale
of public school property to "white flight" academies will not be sanctioned. Those
who seek to continue or re-establish the previously discarded segregated order
through private means are prohibited from receiving government largesse in their
endeavors. Local government units that are under court mandates to operate unitary
school systems have an emphatic duty and responsibility to assure that their relationships or undertakings with private parties in no respect encourage, aid, facilitate, or
result in the establishment or operation of private segregated schools.
United States v. Mississippi, 499 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1974).
54. Brief for Petitioners at 30.
55. Id.
56. Id; quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 466 (1973).
57. Brief for Petitioners at 31.
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that use must be beneficial to the school, and therefore a violation
of the fourteenth amendment. The petitioners clarified their test by
including only activity that can be traced to the private school's
planned curriculum or recreational program. Thus the offending
activity is that undertaken by the school; it is the school which
cannot constitutionally receive aid from the city. Individual use,
outside the ambit of school programs, is unaffected. In sum, the
petitioners argued that segregated private schools must be barred
from any program-oriented use of public recreational facilities, irrespective of the exclusivity of that use."
The petitioners qualified their approach to accommodate two
fundamental notions apparent in the Supreme Court's decisions.
First, with a nod to the Moose Lodge case,59 the petitioners conceded
that the city does not become unconstitutionally involved in private
discrimination by providing essential services to segregated schools.
Accordingly, the petitioners did not object to the city's provision of
electricity, water, and police and fire protection. On the other hand,
they distinguished public recreational facilities as not traditional
municipal monopolies essential to the public health and safety. Like
the textbooks in Norwood,60 recreational facilities need not come
from government but may be procured privately.6' Second, the petitioners agreed that, under Pierce v. Society of Sisters,12 the city
must not deny to private schools the right to exist. Generally, private individuals have a right to associate with whom they please,
and the government has no power to infringe unnecessarily upon
58. Id. at 43. The petitioners suggested that three factors be considered in determining
whether a particular use of public facilities is "program-oriented:"
1. Is the activity occurring during school hours?
2. Are school officials accompanying the students?
3. Was the activity arranged by officials of the school?
59. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
60. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); see note 28, supra.
61. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Gilmore considered municipal recreational facilities of a piece with the "traditional state monopolies" held not to constitute state
action in Moose Lodge. 417 U.S. at 568. The only authority given was Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 296 (1966), in which Mr. Justice Douglas wrote:
A park, on the other hand, is more like a fire department or police department. . . . Mass recreation through the use of public parks is plainly in the public
domain ....
Id. at 302. Perhaps significantly, however, Justice Blackmun's reference to Evans came in
his discussion of the possible state action involved in Montgomery's policy of allowing nonschool groups to use public facilities. There was no hint in his discussion of school groups that
he considered the city's provision of facilities insufficient to confer a benefit on the schools
and thus to violate the school desegregation order.
62. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

1974]

USE OF PUBLIC FACILITIES

that freedom. Thus, suggested the Gilmore petitioners, the City of
Montgomery would not become unconstitutionally involved with
private discrimination if it were to grant segregated schools licenses
necessary for their operation." Indeed, under Pierce, the city might
be required to issue such a license. The petitioners argued, however,
that recreational facilities are not essential to the existence of private schools and may, indeed must, be withheld.
The thrust of the petitioners' approach was to require private
schools to furnish for themselves anything of benefit to them which
is available from sources other than government. The petitioners
sought to turn the focus away from the question of whether blacks
are denied access to public facilities used exclusively by private
schools and toward the question of whether private schools receive
significant benefit from use of public property. 4 The same approach
was adopted by Mr. Justice Brennan in his separate opinion in
Gilmore. Justice Brennan found it unnecessary to remand the case

for consideration of the non-exclusive use of public facilities by
private school groups. He would have held that a city cannot provide public facilities for any school-sponsored use that enables the
63. That, of course, was the holding in Moose Lodge. The petitioners properly recognized that the exception for state monopolies under Moose Lodge blurs into the exception
under Pierce:
For to deny a school the right to fire and police protection or water and sewerage
facilities or lights and heat for the classroom would most surely cause such schools
to cease to function just as effectively as if their operation were made illegal by city
ordinance.
Brief for Petitioners at 47-48.
64. The petitioners' emphasis upon the city's responsibility flowing from the school
desegregation order was demonstrably unsettling to the majority. Justice Blackmun was
apparently troubled by the focus on the extent to which the segregationist academies in
Montgomery were benefitted, when the basis of the petitioners' case was racial discrimination
in the operation of public recreational facilities. It was as though the petitioners had obtained
access to a federal forum to complain about one thing but then sought to address the evils
associated with something else. The argument thus appeared disjointed, leading the majority
to intimate the existence of standing issues in the case. See Part 11-A, supra. While the
majority's difficulty was perhaps understandable in light of the peculiar circumstances in
Gilmore, it is unfortunate that the Court did not fully appreciate the way in which the various
issues coalesced to describe Montgomery's long-standing, many-faceted opposition to racial
integration in any form. By 1974, civil rights groups in the city were simply unable to litigate
one issue without finding the case spilling over into other related questions, some already
litigated and some not. Surely, in such a situation, it would be blinking reality to deny blacks
the ability to take advantage of ground already won on other fronts in the course of litigating
different, yet related, questions. Thus it was entirely appropriate for the Gilmore petitioners
to first establish their injury due to the discriminatory operation of recreational facilities and
then to rely on the city's special duty to disestablish the dual school system to establish their
right to injunctive relief.
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school to "duplicate public school operations at public expense." 5
Justice Brennan's formula would require an inquiry in every case as
to whether the private school may construct and maintain its own
facility, if a public facility were unavailable." The separate opinion
by Justice White took a similar approach but shunned the case-bycase analysis suggested by Justice Brennan. Justice White was prepared to hold that private segregated schools may not use public
facilities of any kind for school-sponsored events that form a part
of the curriculum. 7 Although Justice White did not discuss his apparent disagreement with Justice Brennan, he seemingly found it
unnecessary to determine whether the schools may be able to save
capital by using public facilities. The use alone is enough.
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the majority rejected all this.
He ruled on the easiest question-use of public facilities for official
school functions-and returned the rest of the case to the district
court for development of the record. The limited treatment of the
non-exclusive use issue was clearly unnecessary. There was ample
support in the record for a principled decision on non-exclusive use.
In concentrating on the nature of the use rather than its benefit to
private schools, the Court missed the single most important issue
in the case, so far as school use of public facilities was concerned."
That significant question was elaborately briefed by the petitioners
and should have been determined. The concurring Justices found
the record sufficient to support a holding on organized, though nonexclusive, use of public facilities. At the very least, the Court should
have been prepared to go as far as Justice Brennan and to hold that
private schools cannot validly be permitted to duplicate the programs of public schools at public expense. Justice White's willingness to enjoin any organized use of public facilities by private
schools was warranted, but conceivably the petitioners' emphasis
upon recreational facilities justified restricting relief to playing
fields and similar facilities which can be constructed and maintained by private schools for themselves.69 The majority's enchantment with the city's role in allocating public facilities apparently
65. 417 U.S. at 577 (Brennan, J., concurring).
66. Justice Brennan indicated, however, that he would be prepared to uphold a ban on
.any private school use of public recreational facilities, if the district court were to find that
such an injunction is necessary to enforce the outstanding desegregation orders. Id. at 577.
67. 417 U.S. at 581 (White, J., concurring).
68. In the writer's view, the last issue in Gilmore, the use of public facilities by nonschool private groups with discriminatory admissions policies, raises even more stimulating
questions for examination and decision. This article treats those problems in Part II, infra.
69. See note 49, supra.
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stemmed from its understanding of the circuit court's order. While
a decision-making role for the city surely would add strength to the
argument that a particular use of public facilities by private schools
should be enjoined, it is hardly a necessary element of a claim. Of
course, any relief granted to the petitioners must be in the form of
an order addressed to the city and its agents, for only they have the
responsibility to desegregate the public schools and parks in Montgomery. And, in order to comply with an injunction, the city must
have or obtain some general knowledge of the uses to which private
schools put public facilities. But certainly an order can be enforced
even though the authorities have had no hand in scheduling the
prohibited activities. 0 The last feature of the majority opinion, its
reliance upon the district court to put meat on the bones of its
tightly drawn decision, was also unnecessary. In point of fact, the
district court had already held that any use of public facilities by
private schools violated the school desegregation order." The Supreme Court's opinion did not provide guidance that might cause
the district court to change its original position. At the most, the
Court's referral back to the district court was a direction to take
more testimony before entering a broad injunctive order, even when
72
the evidence already of record supports the award of relief.
III.

USE OF FACILITIES BY PRIVATE NON-SCHOOL GROUPS WITH
CRIMINATORY ADMISSION POLICIES

Dis-

The last issue in Gilmore was the question of whether the district court acted properly in enjoining any use of public facilities by
private non-school groups with racially discriminatory admissions
policies. 73 The district court's position was that by providing aid to
70. An example should make this plain. If a private segregated school were to occupy a
portion of a park for an organized softball game, the district court might well find a violation
of the school desegregation order, even though the city authorities were not involved in
scheduling the game and in fact knew nothing about it. See 417 U.S. at 577 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). The city might comply with the order by informing segregated schools that they
may no longer make use of public facilities. Then, spot checks by police and occasional
reminders would insure continued compliance.
71. See note 15, supra.
72. In fairness, it must be reported that counsel for the petitioners, in defending the
district court's original order, emphasized his intimate understanding of the case and the
relevant circumstances in Montgomery. Brief for Petitioners at 21. The Court may have been
influenced by that approach. See 417 U.S. at 576 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
It is also true that the Supreme Court has always relied heavily upon the lower federal courts
in developing and applying constitutional doctrine regarding desegregation of public schools.
See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
73. The lower courts did not distinguish between private schools with a declared policy
against admitting blacks And those with open policies but no black students. The test is
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non-school groups that discriminate against blacks, the city had
become involved in private discrimination in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Importantly, the court recognized a fundamental difference between the question of school use and non-school
group use of facilities. While government has an affirmative duty to
foster a unitary public school system, there is no duty to achieve
integration in private non-school organizations. 7 Indeed, the courts
are without p'ower to require wholly private groups to admit members whom they choose to exclude. 75 Accordingly, while the Gilmore
petitioners were able to rest their claim for relief against school use
of public facilities on the city's special responsibility to disestablish
the dual school system, their claim going to non-school group use
of facilities rested upon the general constitutional prohibition
against state-sponsored racial discrimination. That raised state action questions and the problem was reduced to identifying the ex-

whether desegregation of the public schools is frustrated, and it makes no difference what
policies are followed by private schools, so long as they are, in fact, segregated. See Gilmore
v. City of Montgomery, 473 F.2d 832, 837-38 (5th Cir. 1973). The Fifth Circuit said in United
States v. Mississippi, 499 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1974) (decided after Gilmore):
Where proscribed state involvement is found to exist with private segregated
academies, appropriate relief must be accorded black persons to remove "root and
branch" the government's aid in whatever form it manifests itself. . . .The ultimate
goal. . . is to make those private enterprises dedicated to segregated schools, private
in fact as well as in name. In this case, the panel opinion merely required the
Academy to make a "boiler plate" promise that it would not discriminate in its
admissions policies. In the cultural and economic milieu of Smith County, this relief
is patently insufficient.
[I t is difficult to conclude that a mere declaration by the Academy that it will
accept minority applicants would result in any appreciable change in the racial
composition of the Academy's student body, especially in view of current admission
charges. Moreover, even assuming economic independence, the Academy's obvious
policy of segregation which infects its scholastic and sports programs would very
likely chill the ambition of any black child who might entertain a desire to attend
classes there.
On the other hand, the lower courts saw the issue differently when it came to non-school
groups. Here, state aid is unconstitutional only if the private group discriminates on the basis
of race. Therefore, the district court's order was addressed only to groups with discriminatory
admissions policies. Presumably, the order reached unannounced as well as announced policies, but it clearly did not reach clubs that happen by chance to be all-white. It is noteworthy
that Mr. Justice Brennan found this distinction important. While he was prepared to express
a view on the exclusive use of public facilities by non-school groups which actually discriminate against blacks, he voted to return the case to the district court for a determination
whether there might be all-white groups that do not discriminate. 417 U.S. at 577-81 (Brennan, J., concurring). Apparently, Justice Brennan would not enjoin even exclusive use of
facilities by all-white groups that have no conscious policy against admitting blacks to membership.
74. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 337 F. Supp. 22, 25-26 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
75. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972).
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tent of the city's involvement in the private discrimination practiced by non-school groups-the familiar process of "sifting facts
and weighing circumstances.""6
The Supreme Court declined to delve deeply into the question
presented, preferring instead to remand the case to the district court
for further development of the record. But the Court did make three
points that warrant attention. First, the Court said that under the
doctrine established in the Moose Lodge case,77 supplying traditional state monopolies, such as electricity, water, and police and
fire protection, to private groups does not constitute state involvement in the discrimination practiced by those groups. City government makes these available to all individuals and groups, and each
enjoys the services in common with all others. In Gilmore, Justice
Blackmun now lumped municipal recreational facilities, such as
parks, playgrounds, athletic facilities, amphitheaters, museums,
and zoos, with the generalized services mentioned in Moose Lodge
and held that the mere provision of such facilities to a private segregated group does not constitute unconstitutional state action. Accordingly, the Court held the district court's order invalid insofar as
it enjoined any use of public facilities by any private segregated
group. On the other hand, the Court said that to the extent the city
rations the use of public facilities rather than leaving them open and
freely accessible to all, a much different case arises. Thus, if the city
placed its power and prestige behind an all-white church baseball
league and provided facilities and equipment for its games, the
Court suggested, but did not decide, that a violation of the equal
protection clause might be found.7 8 Finally, the Court drew attention to the first amendment issue lurking beneath the surface of the
dispute between the Gilmore petitioners and the City of Montgomery. The Court reminded the district court that private citizens
are free to associate with whom they choose, and "a person's mere
membership in an organization which possesses a discriminatory
admissions policy would not alone be ground for his exclusion from
public facilities." 9 This again pointed to the distinction between
76. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). Of course, at
least after the decision in Gilmore itself, the state does have an affirmative duty to end racial
discrimination in the operation of public parks. See note 25, supra and accompanying text.
But that is quite different from a duty to disestablish segregation in wholly private groups.
The establishment of a duty to integrate private organizations would collide head-on with
first amendment freedom of association precedents. See note 79, infra.
77. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
78. 417 U.S. at 568.
79. Id. at 576. The Court derived the right of association from the first amendment in
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exclusive possession-use of a public facility for organized functions-on the one hand and informal use by individuals who hold
membership in segregated private groups on the other. And, once
again the Court suggested, but did not decide, that only the former
might be found to violate the fourteenth amendment.
With deference, it must be said that the Supreme Court's treatment of this last issue in Gilmore leaves much to be desired. The
question of non-school group use of facilities in Montgomery presented an excellent opportunity for a principled decision on the
limits placed by the fourteenth amendment on private use of public
recreational facilities-apart from the gloss thrown over the issue by
the presence of school desegregation considerations. While the record may not have revealed the specifics of the practice in Montgomery, it contained ample evidence of private group use of recreational facilities in the city and sufficiently delineated those aspects
of the problem that might conceivably have been the basis for constitutional adjudication."0 In order to make clear what the Court
might have done, it is necessary to examine the Court's three points,
not in train as they appeared in the opinion, but together, as they
complement each other in a thorough-going analysis.
The Court first lumped public recreational facilities with other
municipal monopolies and concluded that the mere provision of
facilities to segregated private groups is not unconstitutional. Moose
Lodge and Norwood, the school textbook case, developed the doctrine that a city does not become a joint participant in private
discrimination by furnishing to segregated groups services that are
enjoyed in common with others and are not readily available from
any other source." Recreational facilities meet the first criterion;
they are not provided only in connection with the activities of
particular groups-like the textbooks supplied to schools in
a series of cases principally involving the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Bates v.
City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Louisiana
ex rel. Gremillion v. N.A.A.C.P., 366 U.S. 293 (1961); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); see generally Emerson,
Freedom of Associationand Freedomof Expression,74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964). More recently, the
Court has relied on the right of association in protecting the freedom to organize political
parties in order to participate in the electoral process. E.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968). Last term the Court reaffirmed the right in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 723 (1974), and
American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
80. 417 U.S. at 579 (footnote) (Brennan, J., concurring).
81. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465 (1973); see Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972).
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Norwood-but rather are furnished to all. But it is arguable whether
they fit within the second prong of the test. Although recreational
facilities may be supplied principally by government, private groups
are able to construct and maintain their own playing fields. Nevertheless, the Gilmore Court viewed recreational facilities as similar
to other municipal facilities that private groups would not be expected to provide for themselves. These include public parks, museums, and zoos. Accordingly, the Court held that something more
must be shown before the city can be subject to an injunction. Thus
far, the Court's analysis was arguable but not clearly inadequate.
The difficulty arises in the Court's failure to treat the first
amendment issue as it relates to the Moose Lodge-Norwood test
for state involvement. The Court deferred mentioning that private
citizens have a constitutional right of association, derived from the
first amendment, until the last paragraph of the majority opinion.
But the place for an examination of the implications of that right
was in the discussion of the Moose Lodge-Norwood doctrine. The
Constitution protects the freedom of citizens to form organizations
as they see fit, and government has no power to prohibit the maintenance of such associations. Moreover, since the fourteenth amendment addresses only state action, private associations are free to
adopt discriminatory admissions policies. Indeed, such policies are
clearly an exercise of the freedom of expression and association safeguarded by the first amendment.82 That being the case, to the extent
government denies the use of public facilities to private groups on
the basis of admissions policies, it exacts a penalty for the exercise
of constitutionally protected rights. The problem is even more acute
if private facilities are not available and a municipal policy of withholding public facilities from groups with restricted membership
policies results in a curtailment of private associational activity. 3
82.

Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice

Blackmun cited Justice Douglas' language with approval in Gilmore. 417 U.S. at 575.
83. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 647 (1970); cf. Wolin v. Port
of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968) (citizens have
a first amendment right to distribute leaflets in the Port of New York Authority bus ter-

minal). The Court said in Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), that "one is not to
have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that
it may be exercised in some other place." Id. at 163.
Indeed, Professor Emerson has argued that, at least in some circumstances, government
is obligated to open public facilities for associational activity:
Here we are concerned with the power and obligation of the government to make
the means of expression available on a wider scale by itself supplying the physical

or economic facilities.
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The first amendment issue thus adds a third prong to the test from
Moose Lodge and Norwood. Not only may the state furnish private
non-school groups with traditional monopoly services, provided to
segregated groups in common with others; but the state must permit
access to public facilities to make possible the maintenance of private associations.8 4 And, it follows as a corollary that once the state
has decided to extend largesse to non-school groups, it cannot discriminate among groups on the basis of the views held by those
groups. Thus the equal protection clause is also implicated. 5
This was essentially the argument made in behalf of the private

schools in Norwood. In that case, it was contended that under

Pierce v. Society of Sisters,6 children attending private segregated
schools would be denied the equal protection of the laws if they
were not permitted to borrow textbooks from the state in the same
manner as public school children solely because their parents had
exercised the right to send their children to private schools. The

Court responded as follows:
The major development in this area has occurred in the law concerning the right
to use the streets, parks and public open places for purposes of assembly. There is
no doubt, of course, that the government has power to make such facilities available
if it chooses to do so. If it does, the First Amendment imposes certain limits upon
the exercise of that power: the government may not discriminate between users, or
differentiate on the basis of the content of the expression, or impose conditions other
than time, place and manner. More important, despite the doubt at times expressed
by the Supreme Court, there is strong support for the proposition that the government has a constitutional duty to make these facilities available for assembly purposes. That obligation flows from the nature of the right of assembly, which contemplates a public gathering that entails the use of space, and the inadequacy of other
areas where a public assembly can be held. The right to use the streets, parks and
open places in this way constitutes a clear-cut example of the affirmative impact of
the First Amendment.
T. EMERSON, supra at 646. Cf. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181-83 (1972) (recognizing that
the exercise of the freedom of association may be dependent upon access to property); United
States Servicemen's Fund v. Killeen Independent School Dist., 489 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1973)
(suggesting the question but dismissing the petition at bar as moot).
84. Cf. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts):
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions.
Id. at 515; see Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969) (embracing the
Roberts formulation as firm first amendment doctrine).
85, Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972); see Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 315 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The rule was initially
established in Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
86. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

1974]

USE OF PUBLIC FACILITIES

We do not see the issue in appellees' terms. In Pierce, the Court
affirmed the right of private schools to exist and to operate; it said
nothing of any supposed right of private or parochial schools to share
with public schools in state largesse, on an equal basis or otherwise.
It has never been held that if private schools are not given some
share of public funds allocated for education that such schools are
isolated into a classification violative of the Equal Protection
Clause. It is one thing to say that a State may not prohibit the
maintenance of private schools and quite another to say that such
schools must, as a matter of equal protection, receive state aid.
The appellees intimate that the State must provide assistance
to private schools equivalent to that it provides to public schools
without regard to whether the private schools discriminate on racial
grounds. Clearly, the State need not. . . [A] State's special interest in elevating the quality of education in both public and private schools does not mean that the State must grant aid to private
schools without regard to constitutionally mandated standards forbidding state-sponsored discrimination. 7
Significantly, the question in Norwood was the validity of state
assistance to private schools. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's language must be read in the context of the state's affirmative duty to
disestablish the dual school system and to avoid granting to private
schools any aid that "has a significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination." 's In the case of nonschool private groups, the question is somewhat different. There is
no constitutional obligation to integrate private associations; indeed, there is a constitutional bar to state action for that purpose.
Consequently, the language in Norwood is not conclusive of the
issue concerning non-school groups. Here the constitutional right of
association is paramount.
It has long been held that once the state opens public facilities
for general use, the first amendment protection of freedom of expression and the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection of the laws impose limitations on the state's ability to regulate
communicative activity. While reasonable regulations as to time,
place, and manner of expression are valid, if administered in an
evenhanded fashion,"9 "government may not grant the use of a

87. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1973).
88. Id. at 466.
89. E.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949);
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). The cases are collected in Mr. Justice Brennan's
dissenting opinion in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 310 (1974). See also
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 117 (1972).
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forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to
those wishing to express less favored or controversial views." 9 Similarly, private groups cannot be denied the use of public facilities
solely because they have adopted discriminatory admissions policies. A city policy permitting such groups to use public facilities
does not impermissibly involve the government in private discrimination. An admissions policy is merely an exercise of the right of
association; it is a form of expression. In allowing racist groups to
use public facilities, the city no more becomes involved in discrimination than it becomes associated with the content of speeches
made on a street corner. Any rule to the contrary would ascribe to
government the views of every speaker who offers his opinions from
a public platform."
The Supreme Court's opinion in Gilmore only hinted at this
result. The Court suggested that if the city becomes involved in
scheduling softball games for all-white church leagues and provides
facilities and equipment for the games, impermissible state involvement with private discrimination may be found. Although the Court
couched its example in terms of the city's conscious participation
in rationing scarce public facilities, the real evil is that the softball
league would have exclusive possession and use of the public playing
field. That is the type of private use of public facilities of which the
city is aware, placing its power, property, and prestige behind private discrimination. What troubles the Court here is what troubled
it in the section of the opinion in which it considered exclusive use
of public facilities by segregated school groups-the spectre of black
children being denied access to the facility while the private group
is in exclusive possession. In the context of school group use of
public facilities, the exclusion of blacks was a necessary but less
90.
91.
1973):

Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
See National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir.

No case suggests that a group which discriminates in selecting its membership
can be barred from occasional uses of the streets, parks and public meeting places of
a community. No case suggests that in maintaining a street, park or public meeting
place, a state espouses the views which may be there expressed. No more is the state
to be considered as espousing, encouraging, or supporting discriminatory membership policies when it permits an assembly of citizens, organized into a group which
practices discriminatory membership policies, to meet in a public place which has
been dedicated by practice as a public forum for the exercise of the rights to speech
and assembly.
Id. at 1016-17. Ringers enjoined a school board's denial of the use of school facilities to a
successor to the American Nazi Party solely on the basis of the group's racially discriminatory
admissions policy.
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significant element of the petitioners' case. The brunt of their argument focused on the benefits conferred on segregated academies
permitted to use public facilities. On the other hand, in the context
of non-school group use of facilities, the exclusion of blacks alone
must entitle the petitioners to relief. To clarify analysis, a clear
distinction must be drawn between a discriminatory admissions
policy-expression protected by the first amendment-and overt
discrimination in determining access to public facilities-action in
violation of the fourteenth amendment. It is one thing to say that a
private group may consider race in deciding who will be admitted
to membership, and it is quite another to permit such a group to
turn expression into action in determining who will be admitted to
public facilities.12 The resolution of the problem is straightforward.
The state cannot allow private groups to use public facilities in any
manner barred to the state itself. Thus, while a private organization
may decline to admit black people to membership, it cannot fail to
admit them to meetings-if the meetings are held on public property. Certainly, the state cannot bar blacks from public facilities
solely because of race, a suspect classification under the equal protection clause;93 and, that being the case, private groups using
public facilities are similarly restricted. 4
92.

Although a dissenting judge assumed otherwise, a close reading of Ringers reveals

that the majority understood that blacks were not to be denied admission to meetings held
on public property. Id. at 1018 n.16. Cf. Blanton v. State Univ. of New York, 489 F.2d 377,
386-87 (2d Cir. 1973) (a "sleep-in" in a university building is action which may be reasonably
regulated consistent with the first amendment).
93. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
The Supreme Court has developed a two-tier analysis under the equal protection clause.
While, under "traditional" equal protection analysis, a classification is valid if it bears some
rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest, see Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970), the Court has applied a more demanding standard of review in cases in which
a "suspect classification" is present. In "suspect classification" cases, the state must show,
not merely that its classification is rational, but that it is necessary to accomplish some
overriding state purpose or to protect some compelling state interest. McLaughlin v. Florida,
supra.For recent applications of the two-tier approach, see In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)
(alienage), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (sex) (plurality opinion). It would
seem that a private group that seeks to discriminate at meetings held on public property on
the basis of any classification the Supreme Court views as constitutionally suspect will have
a difficult time justifying its action-as would the state if the classification were wholly
public.
94. Initially, the state action involved is the city's policy, conscious or unconscious, of
permitting segregated groups to discriminate in their use of public facilities. If a group
attempts to bar blacks at the door and offended blacks press the point, the city may become
even more deeply involved by providing police protection to the gathering. Certainly, if, on
arriving at the scene to perform a peace-keeping function the police align themselves with
the private group and seek to enforce segregation at the meeting, an unquestionable case of
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The proposal outlined above needs clarification which can best
be achieved through the use of examples. First, assume the case of
a private group that bars blacks from membership. Such a group
can, indeed must, be permitted to hold meetings in public facilities,
but those meetings must be open to blacks. Next, assume that the
same group does not need the entire facility but wants to use some
portion of it. Nothing has changed. The group must be allowed to
hold its meeting, but it cannot discriminate on the basis of race at
the door. Clearly, the state cannot rope off parts of public facilities
and bar admission to them on the basis of race; 5 the same rule
applies to private groups. Now, assume that the group bars admission to a particular black person, not on the basis of race, but on
the ground that he is a lawyer and only doctors are allowed to
become members and to attend meetings of the organization. The
test to be applied is the same as that which would be applicable if
the state were to establish such a classification. Assuming that the
group can show that the doctor-lawyer classification is not a sham
to conceal racial discrimination, the question is whether the classification bears a rational relationship to the purpose of the organization. 6 If the group is a scientific society engaged in cancer research,
exclusion of one who has a legal rather than a medical background
is rational and not unconstitutional.
It is apparent that the proposed resolution of the question left
open in Gilmore contemplates a reasoned accommodation of competing interests. Clearly, this approach fully serves the interests of
neither blacks nor segregated private groups. Blacks necessarily suffer embarrassment and humiliation when groups who preach racial
hatred are permitted to use public facilities. And segregated groups
who wish to use public facilities must agree to admit blacks to
gatherings, if not to membership. 7 The important point is that this
state participation in private discrimination is presented. Cf. United States v. Price, 383 U.S.
787 (1966).
95. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (blacks cannot be required to sit in a special
section of a courtroom).
96. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); see generally Note, Developments in
the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Ray. 1065 (1969).

97. There may be situations in which this distinction is not so clear. Indeed, the case
put by Justice Blackmun in Gilmore is a good example. If an all-white church baseball league
wishes to schedule games at public playing fields, it must be prepared to permit black
children to join in. Practicality may lead inexorably to opening regular team membership to
blacks. While this result tends to cut against protection of the right of association in its logical
extreme, an accommodation of blacks' right to be free of state-sponsored racial discrimination must be reached even in hard, marginal cases. And a requirement that the baseball
league forego its wish to exclude blacks seems to be a reasonable price to pay in exchange for
the advantage of using public playing fields. A different result would impermissibly foster
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approach does serve the purposes of the constitutional provisions
concerned. To the extent a discriminatory admissions policy is mere
expression, the policy is fully protected. At the same time, private
groups are not permitted to extend expression into action, imposing
upon black people the onus of racial discrimination in the operation
of public facilities. If the Gilmore Court had clearly staked out this
ground instead of merely intimating what considerations might be
relevant to some future examination of the problem, the district
court, indeed the rest of us, would now have a roughly marked path
to follow. The Court's concept of state action is fluid, and in order
to appraise with confidence any particular application of the doctrine, courts and lawyers need all the additional guidance the Supreme Court can supply. Moose Lodge and Norwood offered limited
help; Gilmore promised but failed to provide additional guide lines.
As it is, we are left after Gilmore with little more than we had before
the Court undertook to treat the case.
Of course, the approach suggested here hardly solves all the
problems that may arise. After the simple examples suggested
above, the hypotheticals become more difficult. What happens if
the association of doctors is not a research group but merely a social
club? Is there any longer a rational basis for excluding a lawyer from
meetings held on public property? If the group has secret protocols
or rites, is maintaining their integrity a sufficient reason for excluding non-members? Or does the Constitution effectively bar the Masons from using public meeting places? Do 4-H clubs, the Boy
Scouts, or veterans' groups have any authority at all to limit meetings held on public property to dues-paying members? These questions were not presented in Gilmore, and clearly the Court did not
address them. Even if the Court had adopted the approach suggested above, these questions would remain. The principle that private groups using public facilities are subject to the same restrictions under the equal protection clause as would apply to the state
itself throws but dim light on these further and exceedingly difficult
problems. The only saving grace is that the Court will not in all
likelihood be called upon to decide what standards can validly be
applied in determining who can be barred from attending a meeting
of the Boy Scouts. That kind of problem seldom engenders the
conflict and hostility-and therefore litigation-associated with
racial discrimination. To be sure, "[r]ights tend to declare themthe discriminatory operation of public facilities, a clear violation of the fourteenth amendment.
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selves absolute to their logical extreme,"98 and a decision regarding
racial discrimination will bear on analogous future cases. But the
proposed resolution of the racial discrimination issue would hardly
wrap the Court in a straight jacket in non-racial cases. Indeed, the
Court would be left free to accord due deference to non-suspect
classifications and to arrive at a reasonable accommodation of interests in a given case.99 Thus, if the Court in Gilmore had dealt in a
principled manner with the question which was presented in that
case, reasonably foreseeable applications of the doctrine established
could now be more easily and fairly handled. If a case not involving
racial discrimination should arise, there will be time enough to consider, on concrete facts, what is a reasonable ground for barring
persons from gatherings on public property.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In summary, the opinion in Gilmore must be found wanting.
Instead of taking advantage of the excellent opportunity the case
presented for a principled decision on the merits, the Court employed what can only be considered evasive techniques in order to
avoid thorough analysis. The Court implied that the petitioners
might lack standing to raise the question of non-exclusive use of
public facilities by segregated school groups, even when a thoughtful examination of that argument would have shown it to be without
sound basis. Vague complaints about the adequacy of the record
ignored critical evidence and concealed shallow analysis. The Court
did decide whether school groups may have exclusive use of facilities, but even that holding was tied so closely to the history of civil
rights litigation in Montgomery that the decision may have limited
value as precedent. Coming to the last question in the case-the use
of public facilities by non-school groups-the Court offered only
vague references to appropriate considerations rather than princi98. Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (opinion of Mr. Justice
Holmes), quoted in Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611-12 (1974).
99. By this the writer does not mean to promote the two-tier approach to constitutional
adjudication under the equal protection clause. That doctrine is presently under constructive
criticism which the writer finds persuasive. See, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417,
430 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 730 (1973) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1
(1972); see note 93, supra. All agree, however, that some classifications should be subject to
less rigid scrutiny than others, and the suggestion here is that the Supreme Court may well
determine that the Boy Scouts should be given considerable leeway in establishing standards
for attendance at meetings-if, that is, the Boy Scouts find it necessary to establish standards
at all and a person barred from attending a meeting finds it necessary to litigate the matter.
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pled decision. Although the Court might have clearly distinguished
between discriminatory admissions policies and discrimination at
the door of gatherings on public property, protecting the one and
condemning the other, the opinion merely returned the case to the
district court for further treatment of the fluid state action issue. In
consequence, the only test to be followed is the unpredictable process of "sifting facts and weighing circumstances," unaided by doctrinal statements that sketch the boundaries of the analysis in a
particular fact situation.
A thorough treatment of the issues raised in Gilmore would
have recognized at the outset that the circuit's distinction between
exclusive and non-exclusive use of public facilities is meaningless in
the context of segregated school use of facilities. Once the petitioners established injury in fact arising from the discriminatory operation of facilities, they were entitled to rely on the city's affirmative
duty to disestablish the dual school system in Montgomery. Inasmuch as public aid to private segregated schools, which significantly tends to facilitate private school discrimination, is unconstitutional, the petitioners were entitled to an injunction against any
program-oriented use of facilities by segregated academies. Outside
the context of school desegregation, the circuit's exclusivity test is
not only meaningful but critical. The Court in Gilmore should have
identified the core of the problem concerning non-school group use
of public facilities as the interplay between blacks' right to be free
of state-sponsored racial discrimination at gatherings held on public
property and private groups' first amendment right of association.
While wholly private organizations are free to admit whom they
choose to membership, once they undertake to hold meetings on
public property they become subject to the same equal protection
restrictions which would apply to the state itself. Accordingly,
blacks cannot be denied admission to meetings solely on the basis
of race.
Gilmore thus leaves lingering doubts about the quality of the
decision-making and opinion-writing process in the Supreme Court.
If, as Professor Hart suggested, the Court is "trying to decide more
cases than it can decide well,"'' 0 perhaps the time has come to
become serious about reform of the federal judicial process at the
appellate level. The system cannot afford poorly considered and
written Supreme Court opinions that fail to serve the law
declaration function necessary to reasoned adjudication of the
100.

Hart, supra note 12.

690
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countless cases that come before the American courts each year.
This is not to suggest that the Court can or should attempt the futile
task of establishing bright line doctrine to control unforeseeable
disputes in the future. Certainly, the future cannot be foreseen, and
the Court is properly hesitant to use broad language that may cause
logical difficulty later and must be prepared to re-examine its own
decisions when necessary. Constitutional principles have ragged
edges, and adjustments will always be necessary in borderline cases.
On the other hand, the Court cannot fail to decide issues that fairly
are presented by docketed cases. Legitimate disputes must be resolved for the sake of litigants, present and future. The system
depends for guidance upon principled decisions that are both certain and flexible enough to stand the test of time. This is the essential function of the Supreme Court.

